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SMEs and Banks: Investigating the Link between Trust and the Pledg-
ing of Personal Collateral 
 
 
Abstract 
Research on relationship lending focuses attention on economic factors which influence 
the relationships between SMEs’ owners/managers and banks but no previous work has 
focused on the role of trust. Trust is expected to reduce agency costs, the perceived 
credit risk and, thus, influence credit availability and credit terms. Trustworthiness is 
associated with three attributes of SME owner managers’ namely; ability, benevolence 
and integrity. It is hypothesised that lending managers’ assessment of the trustworthi-
ness of SME owner managers affects the request of personal collateral from bank when 
credit is provided. Trustworthiness is hypothesised as negatively associated with per-
sonal collateral in the form of personal guarantees and personal assets. Using the data 
obtained from a survey of lending managers from banks in North East Italy we test this 
relationship. Research methods include construction of control variables and a vector of 
trustworthiness factors based on the data collected on a random sample of 535 borrow-
ing firms. Results from the regression analysis show some evidence that the line of 
credit of firms enjoying high level of trust are less collateralised with entrepreneurs’ 
personal assets even if the significance of both the specification and trust is low. Our 
findings support the view found in earlier literature on trust that personal collateral 
pledging is decided at the beginning of the relationship and then such a decision is not 
changed by the bank. Some implications of these results and future research are dis-
cussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The banking system is essential for the life of firms and especially for small and me-
dium enterprises as they do not have access to capital markets. Lending process is very 
complex and substantially involves the risk evaluation of the firms. Banks rely on dif-
ferent lending technologies and tend to use more than one technology at a time (Berger 
& Udell, 2006). Among the various lending technologies, relationship lending has a pe-
culiar role. In relationship lending, the bank relies on a variety of private information 
gathered through contact with the firm, its owner, and the local community in order to 
evaluate the firm (see seminal works by Petersen & Rajan, 1994, 1995 and Berger & 
Udell, 1995). Thus, on one hand the personal ties can help banks to deal with SMEs 
opaqueness and the related difficulty in valuing firm riskiness; on the other small busi-
nesses can be better off because of easier access to credit. Previous research on relation-
ship lending focuses attention on a set of variables such as its length, its closeness, the 
concentration of lending relationships on few banks, the quality of the relationship (Pe-
tersen & Rajan, 1994, 1995, Berger & Udell, 1995, Harhoff & Körting, 1998, Berger, et 
al. 2001, Lehmann & Neuberger, 2001, Stanton, 2002, Akhavein et al., 2004, Elsas, 
2005, Agarwal & Hauswald, 2008). 
Interestingly, when a bank makes a decision to provide credit, even though it is a con-
tractual relationship, it is underpinned by an assessment of trust. From an etymological 
point of view, the word credit derives from the Latin noun creditum which is translated 
as a loan or a thing entrusted to another; the related Latin verb credere means to believe, 
to trust, entrust but also to provide credit (Castiglioni & Mariotti, 1981). The potential 
borrower’s analysis of the risk return trade-off is an assessment of its trustworthiness. 
Literature on trust stresses that high levels of trust are purported to encourage trustwor-
thy behaviour (Nooteboom, 2002) and that trust can play an important role in reducing 
agency problems (such as moral hazard and adverse selection), in cutting transaction 
costs (Macaulay, 1963, Nooteboom et al., 1997) as well as the expenses of monitoring 
and control (see Lewicki et al. 1998). Thus, trusting relationship can benefit banks and 
SMEs. This is not a utopian view of the world and the benefits of increasing levels of 
trustworthiness could include a reduction in the request for collateral. This point is theo-
retically supported by the model proposed by Howorth and Moro (2006). 
Present study analyses whether bank managers’ perceived trustworthiness of the small 
business owner-managers is associated with a request of reduced personal collateral in 
the form of either personal guarantees or pledge of personal assets. The research ques-
tion is tested using a vector which measure trust derived from previous studies, in par-
ticular from Mayer et al. (1995) and uses a unique dataset collected during the period 
2004-2007. Econometric findings support partially our preposition, discovering a nega-
tive relationship between trust and personal collateral provided by the entrepreneur. 
The present paper is organised as follows: section 2 illustrates the literature on relation-
ship lending and trust explaining the role of trust as an independent variable. Section 3 
illustrates the research question and section 4 the methodology and how variables are 
operationalised. In section 5 the research question is tested and the findings are com-
mented. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Banks, SMEs and Trust 
Banks play a key role in financing the firms as they tend to leverage bank debt in pref-
erence of equity. Interestingly, the wide use of bank debt to finance firms and projects is 
not context specific: one finds it for large firms and small ones; in both developed and 
developing economies; in the Continental Europe as well as in Japanese and Anglo-
Saxon world.  
Research on lending argues that the lending technologies can be grouped into four main 
categories (Berger & Udell, 2002): financial statement lending (based on the evaluation 
of information from the financial statement); asset based lending (based on the provi-
sion of collateral and its quality); credit scoring lending (based on statistical tech-
niques); relationship lending. The first three lending techniques are usually grouped to-
gether and labelled transaction lending because the risk evaluation is based on available 
factual and public information, collected independently from the quality of the relation-
ship and include loans that are mainly for non recurrent needs. Relationship lending is 
different from transaction lending because it is based on recurrent needs and focuses on 
the fact that the improvements in the relationships between banks and businesses can 
help the banks in evaluating firms’ riskiness increasing credit availability, reducing the 
cost of credit and the pledging for collateral, accordingly (Agarwal & Hauswald, 2008). 
Berger (1999) summarises the three main characteristics of relationship lending: the in-
formation is gathered beyond the relatively transparent data available in the official 
documents; information gathering is through a continuous process; information remains 
confidential to the provider of funds who uses it as a basis for taking other decisions. 
In reality, the different lending technologies are not mutually exclusive as banks tend to 
use more than one technology at a time (Berger & Udell, 2006). Since the beginning, 
relationship lending research pays particular attention to small firms (Petersen & Rajan, 
1994 and 1995) because they are informationally opaque (Berger et al. 2001) and there-
fore their lending process is more profoundly affected by relationship. Later research 
(for instance, Harhoff & Körting, 1998 but also Akhavein et al., 2004) not only con-
firms this point but it expands the research on the factors that affect relationship lend-
ing. 
2.1 The Request for Collateral 
The firm and the entrepreneur can be asked to provide collateral and guarantees (see 
Berger, et al., 2006) in order to access the credit the firm needs. In Italy, the area where 
data have been collected, local branch bank managers have room for manoeuvre in de-
ciding whether to ask for personal collateral since pledging personal collateral is neither 
implicit in the loan nor decided unilaterally by the top management of the bank. It is 
subject to the local bank manager’s evaluation about the creditworthiness of the firm. 
Collateral gives the lender a claim over specific assets which are controlled by the se-
cured claimants who can prevent the borrower from selling or disposing them. In con-
trast, a guarantee is a general claim and the borrower can sell his/her assets without any 
limits at any time before the lender exerts a claim on them because of a default in repay-
ing principal and/or interest. Italian bank system tends to rely on personal commitments. 
Zecchini and Ventura (2009) found that more than 83% of the Italian small firms pro-
vide personal collateral or personal guarantees to the banks in order to access credit. 
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Literature on bank lending points out that personal commitments have two different 
roles: the first is to reduce the loss in case of default (loss at default) for the lender 
(Blazy & Weill, 2006). Jiménez and Saurina’s (2004) work shows that collateralised 
loans are those with a higher probability of default. A second role personal commit-
ments have, is to align borrower’s and lender’s interests that is to address problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. The argument is that personal commitments in-
crease entrepreneurs’ stake making them exert additional effort in the venture. Avery, et 
al. (1998) as well as Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) research support the opinion that 
commitments are used to influence borrower behaviour to reduce the probability of de-
fault. They argue that personal commitments have a different role with respect the 
firm’s collateral: personal commitments by increasing the liability of the shareholders of 
limited liability firms, reduce the moral hazard as well as adverse selection and agency 
risk. The main role of firms’ collateral is to provide the bank with a hedge in case of 
default (Voordeckers & Steijvers, 2006). 
What affects collateral request? Scholars have approached the problem by looking at 
both the length of the relationship and the age of the firm. There is evidence that the 
probability of gaining credit increases (and being collateralised decreases) with the age 
of the firm (Akhavein et al., 2004) since newer firms are considered to be the riskiest: 
they have to gain market shares, have to survive the start up period of getting estab-
lished. Moreover, the potential lender is uncertain about the competence, skills and 
trustworthiness of the management as well as the kind of investment opportunities that 
could arise (Petersen & Rajan, 1994, Berger & Udell, 1995). By looking at the SMEs, 
Jiménez, et al. (2006) stress the different functions of collateral: younger firms are more 
prone to provide collateral as a way of signalling that they have no problems of moral 
hazard (Bester, 1985). Thus, the older the firm, the longer the current ownership and the 
longer the relationship, the less the collateral requested as already pointed out by Har-
hoff and Körting (1998) and Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000). Put differently, firms 
with more experience appear to be asked to provide collateral less often than other firms 
since a long relationship provides banks with great amount of private information giv-
ing them the possibility to discriminate between firms with poor track records and those 
that present moral hazard and adverse selection risks (Diamond, 1984, Berger, et al., 
2005). 
Longhofer and Santos (2000) by modelling the importance of the bank seniority (ob-
tained through collateral or the use of guarantees), point out that personal commitments 
can be a supporting factor in building relationship lending. The explanation provided is 
based on the idea that “if banks are junior to other creditors, they may benefit little in 
bad states from additional investments in the firm and hence will have little incentive to 
build up relationships that might allow them to determine the value of such an invest-
ment” (Longhofer & Santos, 2000).  
Relationship is also a matter of closeness (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). A large body of 
empirical evidence (for Italy see Castelli et al., 2006) as well as theoretical models 
(Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2004) support this point. The value of private information 
depends on its gathering on one (or few) collector(s), as the greater the concentration, 
the more complete the information, the smaller the agency problems and moral hazard 
risks. Thus, the lower the request for collateral. 
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Finally, relationship lending is a matter of quality of information where the higher its 
quality, the easier for the bank to evaluate the riskiness of the firm the lower the request 
for collateral (Harhoff & Koerting, 1998). Research by Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) 
looks at a set of variables that try to measure the interaction activity between bank man-
ager and the entrepreneur. They find a negative correlation of the interactional variables 
with the collateral request from the bank (i.e. greater interaction is associated to less 
collateral). A corollary to the Harhoff and Koerting (1998) and Lehmann and Neuberger 
(2001) findings is provided by Berlin and Mester’s (1998) who argue that in local and 
more concentrated markets lenders have better information about borrowers. Thus, in 
general lenders ask for less private collateral  
2.2 Trust 
As shown in the literature review provided, previous studies on lending relationships do 
not consider trust among covariates. To the best of our knowledge, only two of them 
consider it as one of the independent variables (Harhoff & Körting, 1998, Ferrary, 
2003) but neither address the role of collateral. Trust as a variable is far too important to 
be overlooked (for a general review see Nooteboom, 2002). Bromiley and Harris (2006) 
argue that excluding trust from lending relationship models partially reduces the ex-
planatory power of the models. Entering trust shifts the attention from the traditional 
approach linked to transaction costs economics and agency theory to a wider (and more 
complex) approach where interpersonal ties and relationship are taken into considera-
tion (Barney, 1990). 
The importance of trust in human relations is highlighted by various authors. The exten-
sive literature on trust emphasizes that its presence reduces agency problems (e.g. Ring 
& Van den Ven 1992); cuts transaction costs (e.g. Macaulay, 1963); reduces expenses 
of monitoring and control (e.g. Zand, 1972); decreases the use of legalistic remedies 
(Sitkin & Roth, 1993); improves relationships (e.g. Fisman & Khanna, 1999); supports 
cooperation (e.g. Doz); aids decision taking in a situation where information is scarce 
(e.g. Luhmann, 2000). Trust is closely linked to ethics, it is culturally specific 
(Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994) and is a construct common to various disciplines from so-
ciology and psychology, to economics, and organisational relations (see Rousseau, et 
al., 1998). The multidisciplinary interest in trust implies different approaches to analys-
ing it. 
Trust must not be confused with confidence which implies that one does not consider 
the alternative opportunities, or with reliance which is simply dependent on the proven 
capability. Trust requires a previous engagement of one person and presupposes a situa-
tion of risk where the damage is greater than the advantage. Mayer et al. (1995) present 
a useful definition of trust which shows trust as the willingness to accept the conse-
quences of placing trust in a trustee: 
“the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based 
on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor and control that other party” 
(Mayer et al., p. 712, 1995). 
Page 7 of 23 
Since there is no single universally accepted definition of trust it makes difficult to find 
what affects trust. Indeed, if trust is identified with a subjective probability that the 
trusted party will not abuse the trust put in by the trustee, anything that contributes to 
this subjective probability would belong to trust (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Mayer et. al., 
(1995) provide one framework to model the relationship based lending behaviour that 
incorporates trust. Howorth and Moro (2006) adapted Mayer et. al., (1995) model to 
lending relationships. This study follows the Howorth and Moro (2006) model (Figure 
1). 
The perception of another’s trustworthiness underpins the trust that exists between 
them. The focus here is on factors that influence the lending managers’ assessments of 
trustworthiness. Mayer et al. (1995) suggest that trustworthiness is based on three fac-
tors: ability, benevolence and integrity. Ability looks at aspects such as skills and com-
petence, it is domain specific and it cannot necessarily be generalised to other situations. 
Trust in the owner/manager’s business ability will reduce the bank manager’s perceived 
likelihood of default risk. Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is voluntarily be-
lieved to do good to the trustor. Often, benevolence is viewed as relationship specific. In 
the bank – owner/manager relationship benevolence can play an important role; it can 
increase the expectation of the bank manager that the SMEs owners/managers will meet 
the obligations (repayment plans, covenants, etc.). Integrity is the trustor’s perception 
that the trustee adheres to a set of principles considered acceptable to the trustor. Integ-
rity (i.e. morality and ethical principles) is not linked to skills or competences nor is it 
relationship specific (morality is over and above each kind of specific relationship). In-
tegrity is quite intrinsic part of individual’s commitments to moral principles making 
integrity a personal characteristic of owner/manager. Thus, integrity is perceived as high 
only when trustor (that is bank manager) perceives that trustee’s (that is 
owner/manager) moral principles and ethics are close to his/hers. In lending relation-
ships, integrity can help to reduce the expectation of moral hazard, as well as increasing 
the perceived reliability of information supplied by the SMEs owners/managers. 
Ability, benevolence and integrity will contribute to an assessment of the trustworthi-
ness of each SME owner/manager. Earlier research has found it difficult to distinguish 
empirically between of trustworthiness factors, particularly benevolence and integrity 
(Nooteboom, et al., 1997) and it has been suggested that perceptions of trustworthiness 
draw on all the trustworthiness factors with varying degrees of emphasis depending on 
the context. 
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Figure 1 - Influences on Trust, Risk and Lending Outcomes (Adapted from Howorth & Moro, 2006) 
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3 Research question 
The literature about trust points out its relevance as a means of reducing transaction and 
agency costs. At the same time, literature on relationship lending stresses the impor-
tance of agency issues and moral hazard reduction to reduce risk and improve credit 
availability also reducing the request of collateral. Interestingly, by conflating the two 
streams of research a general question arises i.e. what is the impact of trust on the lend-
ing relationships between banks and small firms owners/managers? More specifically, 
does trust decrease the request of personal collateral, that is collateral provided by the 
shareholders and managers of the firm? 
As illustrated above, the trust which is bestowed on SMEs owners/managers is expected 
to be based on an assessment of the SME owners/managers’ integrity, benevolence and 
ability which will have been made by way of the individual cognitive process of trust 
formation of the trustor, in this case, of the bank manager. 
Because of the trust formation process and what affects it, trust can influence and re-
duce the request of collateral. Thus, Howorth and Moro (2006) develop a proposition 
that states that the “Requests for collateral and personal guarantees are negatively re-
lated to bank manager’s trust.”  This study investigates whether the proposition is sup-
ported by empirical analysis of lending decisions taken by banks. 
 
4. Research Method and Data 
We use both qualitative and quantitative approaches in this study. Measurement of trust 
was carried out using a survey of perceptions and actions of lending bank managers. 
Having measured the trust this measure is used along with other variables to carry out a 
quantitative analysis of the impact of these variables on private collateral requested the 
banks. The findings were discussed with a panel of SMEs owners/managers and bank 
managers. 
The data on trustworthiness factors was collected using a survey filled in by the bank 
manager. The main body of the survey was aimed at collecting information on manage-
rial and financial aspects of the firm along with various items which measure the three 
trustworthiness factors (integrity, ability and benevolence) and then perceived trust as is 
explained below. 
Factor analysis is employed to test whether trust could be derived from the vector of 
items. The research question is then investigated using logit regression with a boot-
strapped estimation of the standard errors. In fact, the dependent variable is a dummy 
one that assumes value 1 if the shareholders/managers provide personal collateral and 0 
otherwise. The bootstrap technique in estimating standard errors of the dependent vari-
able provides an estimate of the standard errors that is not linked to assumptions regard-
ing the probability distribution of the population (Efron, 1979). In other words, it is a 
robust system to estimate the standard errors and significance level in general and spe-
cifically for the regression covariates (Efron & Tibshirani, 1998). 
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4.1 Model Specification 
Foregoing literature review identified that there are various variables that could influ-
ence private commitments. However, our interest in this study is to investigate the role 
of trust on personnel commitments while controlling for the impact of other non-trust 
related variables. We therefore divide all the identified explanatory variables into three 
sets of variables. In first category we group together variables which are exogenous to 
firm such as location, competition, among banks, the region, the economic conditions. 
In second category interest paid, amount of credit gained, the average used debt, and 
size (turnover) of firm are included. These are collectively called ‘hard variables’ as 
they represent hard information or data. In the third category we group together vari-
ables that measure the strength of relationship and trust. These are length of relation-
ship, frequency of meetings, number of relationship managers and multiple relation-
ships with the bank. In order to investigate our research question following models were 
used. This approach gives us the possibility to verify which vector affects personal 
commitments independently of other vectors. 
Exogenous variables 
COLL = β0+(β1LOCNAT + β2NBANKS + β3REGION + β4ECON) + ε (Equation 1) 
Hard variables 
COLL = β0+ (β5INTOV + β6OVDUSE + β7LNTURNOVR + β8LNSTD) + ε  (Equation 2) 
Relationship variables 
COLL = β0+ (β9LNLENGTH + β10FREQREV + β11FREQMEET + β12MANAGER + β13MULTI  + 
β14TRUST) + ε         (Equation 3) 
Then, in order to investigate the overall impact of different covariates, we uses a the fol-
lowing specification where the three vectors are entered together 
COLL = β0+(β1LOCNAT + β2NBANKS + β3REGION + β4ECON) +  (β5INTOV + β6OVDUSE + 
β7LNTURNOVR + β8LNSTD) + (β9LNLENGTH + β10FREQREV + β11FREQMEET + 
β12MANAGER + β13MULTI  + β14TRUST) + ε 
All the terms used in the above equations are explained in the next paragraph.  
4.2. Operationalisation of the variables 
This section illustrates how variables are operationalised and their main statistics.  
Dependent Variable 
Personal commitments can be measured in two different ways: by looking at the value 
of the assets provided by managers and shareholders; or by simply looking if they pro-
vide personal commitments. The former approach is difficult to implement as reliable 
data can not be collected: entrepreneurs and managers are unwilling to disclose the 
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value of their personal wealth; even when provided such values can be difficult to ascer-
tain in absence of market prices. Thus, collateral and guarantees are measured using a 
dummy variable that simply state whether the credit is assisted by some kind of person-
nel commitment. This research follows such an approach. We operationalise the de-
pendent variable (COLL) by using a dummy variable that has the value of 1 when the 
credit is assisted by personal commitments and 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variable 
Trust is measured according to a vector of 10 items that measure the three trust factors.  
 
Table 1 – Trustworthiness Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The bank managers were asked to evaluate the items on a 5 point Likert-type scale be-
tween “I totally disagree” (1) to “I totally agree” (5). Each item was based on previous 
trust inventories (e.g. Cummings & Bromiley, 1995, Currall & Judge, 1995) as well as 
items previously developed according to the proposed model, since they gave reliable 
results (see Mayer & Davies, 1999, Jarvenpaa et al., 1998). Table 1 list the items. They 
are reduced to one TRUST factor using factor analysis. The factor is expected to be 
negatively related to COLL since the higher the trust, the lower the probability that en-
trepreneurs and managers are asked to provide personal commitments. 
Trust items data are reported in table 2. The mode score is 4 (I partially agree) for each 
item except for the item “The entrepreneur pays attention to the needs of his/her em-
ployee” and “The entrepreneur is very involved in the community” where the mode 
score is 3 (neither agree nor disagree). The average of each item is above 3 which stands 
for neutral. The lowest average is 3.08 (“The entrepreneur is very involved in the com-
The entrepreneur knows very well the market in which he/she operates ABI1 
The entrepreneur is good at selecting the needed resources ABI2 
The entrepreneur is good at managing the resources ABI3 
The entrepreneur is good at understanding market evolution ABI4 
The entrepreneur adapts his/her interests with those of his/her  
commercial partners 
BEN1 
The entrepreneur pays attention to the needs of his/her employees BEN2 
The entrepreneur is very involved in the community BEN3 
The entrepreneur is totally honest during negotiations with commercial  
partners 
INT1 
The entrepreneur is consistent in his /her behavior and decisions INT2 
INT3 
Ability 
Benevolence 
Integrity 
If you know that the entrepreneur is looking for a personal assistant,  
Would you suggest a female friend to apply to the firm? 
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munity”) while the highest is 4.11 (“The entrepreneur knows very well the market in 
which he/she operates”). 
As previously illustrated trust is a complex construct: its components interact and help 
jointly the development of trust. The factor analysis of the survey provides a strong 
support to this point: it is very hard to split trust in its trustworthiness factors. Principal 
components analysis was employed to reduce the vector of ten items into trustworthi-
ness factors. However, empirically, the (forced) two and three factors models were al-
ways sub-optimal with Eigenvalues well below 1.0 for all factors except the first one 
(although the items did load as expected on components representing ability, benevo-
lence and integrity).  
 
Table 2 – Trust indicators ability, benevolence and integrity (N=457) 
Var. Description Mean St.Dev. Factor1 
TRUST 
Uniqueness 
ab1 
the entrepreneur knows very well the mar-
ket in which she/he operates  
4.11 
 
.71 
 0.7268 0.4717 
ab2 
the entrepreneur is able in selecting the 
needed resources 
3.71 
 
.80 
 0.7139 0.4908 
ab3 
the entrepreneur is able in managing the 
resources 
3.80 
 
.78 
 0.7764  0.3973  
ab4 
the entrepreneur is able in understanding 
market evolution 
3.81 .78 0.7450  0.4449  
ben1 
the entrepreneur adapts his interests to suit 
those of commercial partners 
3.78 .70 
 0.7599  0.4226  
ben2 
the entrepreneur pays attention to the needs 
of the employees 
3.54 .75 
 0.6566  0.5688  
ben3 
the entrepreneur is very involved in the 
community 
3.09 1.17 
 
 
int1 
the entrepreneur is totally honest in nego-
tiations with commercial partners 
3.88 .72 
 0.6437 0.5856  
int2 
the entrepreneur is consistent in his deci-
sions and behaviour 
3.81 .69 
 0.7417  0.4499  
int3 
you would be happy to recommend to a 
female friend to work in the firm 
3.43 .95 
 0.7051  0.5079 
 
The one component model was superior and had very high reliability. BEN3 (involve-
ment in community) had a low communality and was dropped from the PCA which im-
proved the reliability analysis. PCA was run on nine items (Cronbach Alpha 0.8806). 
The PCA results indicate that perceived trustworthiness in this context appears to be a 
single complex entity that draws on ability, benevolence and integrity. This is in line 
with previous research (Nooteboom et al., 1997) that found it difficult to distinguish 
empirically between trustworthiness factors, particularly benevolence and integrity. As 
a consequence, one factor (TRUST) was extracted from the nine items instead of trying 
to extract three factors (ability, benevolence and integrity).  
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Control Variables - Exogenous 
Berlin and Mester (1998) stress that in local and more concentrated markets lenders 
have better information about borrowers since news and gossip travel fast. As a matter 
of fact, lenders ask for less private commitments to compensate for the improved access 
to information. In the regressions, the number of the banks that operate in each munici-
pality are entered (N_BANKS) as proxy for concentration in the lending market. A 
negative relation is expected between the concentration and request for collateral. The 
study focuses on two different regions. A dummy variable (REGION) is included where 
1 represents Friuli Venezia Giulia. Firms in Friuli Venezia Giulia have less access to 
grants and public sources of finance and are less protected than those in South Tyrol. In 
addition, in Friuli firms face more competition from firms which have headquarters out-
side of the region.  
The dataset has data from local and large banks a dummy variable (LOC_NAT) is used 
to control for the type of bank. Large banks (1) are supposed to be less supportive and 
consequently a positive relation with the dependent variable is expected. As argued by 
previous literature, a positive correlation between personal commitments and risk is ex-
pected (Berger & Udell, 1995). The covariate that tries to measure the risk (at systemic 
level) is ECON. It is an index collected by Bank of Italy in accordance to the European 
Central Bank, which measures the expected change in providing credit to customers. It 
is implicitly a measure of the change in perceived risk linked to change in economic 
climate. It is collected every three months through a survey administered to bank man-
agers. The values used are those collected by Bank of Italy in the quarter when the data 
were collected in each bank. Since positive values are associated to a more stringent 
credit policy, a positive relationship between ECON and COLL is expected. 
Control Variables - Hard 
Riskiness is linked to firm size: bigger firms need more finance on one hand and are 
considered less risky on the other. In addition, they have greater negotiation power as 
found by Lehmann and Neuberger (2001). In the regressions, the size of the firm is 
measured by the natural logarithm of the annual turnover (LN_TURNOVER), in line 
with previous empirical research and a negative relation is expected. Three financing 
specific covariates are considered: the amount of short term credit provided by the bank 
in the form of natural logarithm (LNSTD), the average used short term debt 
(OV_USED) and the interest rate charged (INT). They are expected to be positively re-
lated to personal commitments requested. The bigger the amount of credit provided, the 
greater the risk for the bank and the more likely to be asked to provide some kind of 
hedging. The higher the use of the short term provided the greater the perceived riski-
ness of the firm. Regarding the interest rate on overdraft (INT_OV), literature stresses 
that when banks cannot discriminate a priori between different levels of risk of the in-
vestments because of inadequate information, they offer high/low interest and low/high 
collateral pairings in order to cause high and low risk borrowers to self select (Bester, 
1985). In this case, the pairings of interest/collateral can clear the market. Clearly, there 
is no causation between interest and commitments but a negative correlation is ex-
pected. We decided to avoid traditional variables to control for the quality of the firm. 
In fact, neither the profit nor the assets are entered in the regression. The decision is 
linked with the poor quality of this data: they are strongly affected by the accounting 
standard used by Italian SMEs and by accounting creativity.  
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Control Variables – Relationship and Trust  
The relationship provides the banks with additional information that helps to increase 
the knowledge of the firm and the general context as well. As pointed out by some theo-
retical models, borrowing constraints become less strict with time because of the in-
creased reputation of the borrower (Martinelli, 1997). At the same time, when firms are 
small, they can face hold up problems (Howorth et al., 2003). In line with the previous 
empirical research the log of the length of the relationship (LN_LENGTH) is entered in 
the regression and a positive relationship is expected to occur since the bank capture 
effect is likely to prevail over the information production effect. If the firm has more 
than a simple lending relation with the bank (for instance, it relies on the bank for cash 
management), it has the possibility to give the bank a lot of additional information about 
firm performance. MULTI is a dummy variable that control for it. When the informa-
tion is held by few or even only one bank manager, information dissipation is reduced: a 
positive relationship between the number of people involved in the relationship at bank 
level (MANAGERS) and personal commitments is expected. At the same time, the 
lending relationship is influenced by bank manager perception of facing a situation with 
reduced information asymmetry. Previous research (Berger et al., 2001) stresses the im-
portance of the frequency the bank manager meets firms: this increases the acquisition 
of private information and helps in better evaluating firm’s risk and, from the firm point 
of view, in reducing the request of private commitments (FREQ_MEET). The same ef-
fect is expected for FREQ_REV which measure the reviewing activity. 
4.2 Sample Data 
The research focuses mainly on local community banks that have the legal form of the 
Banche di Credito Cooperativo. The decision to pay attention to them is twofold: previ-
ous research stresses local banks’ role in affecting national growth (Usai & Vannini, 
2005); they are very small, are local and have strong ties with the community. The sam-
ple is represented by six Raiffeisenkassen and two Banche di Credito Cooperativo. In 
addition, data was collected from local branches of two large national banks. 
A sample of non agricultural SMEs firms (as defined by European Community stan-
dards) was created for each bank. The sample was built up randomly and represents be-
tween 10% and 20% of the overall number of firms that had a credit facility with the 
bank (in terms of both short-term and long-term debt) in the case of local bank while for 
large national banks the sample represents less than 1% of the entire population and 
around 5% of the local population of customers. The initial list contains 535 firms 
which provided a final dataset of 457 useful observations (85.44%) with a turnover be-
tween 13,000 Euros and 46,900,000 Euros. The overall response rate is homogeneous 
among the different banks. Summary of  the data is reported in table 3. 
In the dataset 81.10% of the firm credit is collateralised with some form of personal 
commitments. This percentage is very close to the figure reported by Zecchini and Ven-
tura (2009) who, by looking at the Italian Central Bank dataset (Centrale Rischi) found 
that more than 83% of the Italian firms provide some form of personal commitments to 
the bank system in order to access the credit they need. 
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Table 3 Summary statistics of variables used (N= 457) 
Variable Description Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Commitments (0=no commitments; 
1=commitments) = personal and firm 
assets 
COLL1 NA 
 
 0 
18.90% 
1
81.10%
Used debt (in percentage) = percentage 
of the rolling credit facility used 
OVDUSE 60.67% 
 
35.62 0 132
Typology of Bank (0 = Local; 1 = Na-
tional) 
LOCNAT NA 
 
 0 
18.47% 
1
81.53%
Interest rate on overdraft – percentage 
(N =444) 
INT_OV 5.35 1.43 1 12.75
Number of banks in the area NBANKS 6.92 
 
4.04          1 12
Region (0=Alto Adige; 1=Friuli)  REGION 1 NA 
 
 0 
87.25% 
1
12.75%
Bank of Italy coefficient about expecta-
tions in increasing (positive) or reducing 
(negative) rigidity in providing 
new/additional credit 
ECON .059 
 
.39 0 .17
Turnover of the firm for the most recent 
complete financial year (absolute values 
in thousands) - € 
LNTURNOVR 2,205,000 
 
4,629,000 13,000 46,900,000
Length of the relationship in years LNLENGTH 10.34 7.72 0 35
Short Term Credit Provided - € LNSTD 299,099 638,697 0 7,500,000
Frequency of reviewing = number of 
reviewing in a year 
FREQREV 2.04 
 
.48 1 3
Frequency of meetings = times of meet-
ings in a year 
FREQMEET 2.95 
 
1.23 1 4
Number of bank managers involved in 
the relation (N =452) 
MANAGER 1.59 1.16 1 7
Multiple relationship with this bank 
(0=no other bank products, 1=other bank 
products)  
MULTI 1 NA 
 
 0 
41.98 
1
58.02
Trust (Factor) - standardised PCA TRUST -9.34e-10 .94 -4.24 2.24
1
 Dummy variable (mean and standard deviation meaningless 
 
5. Testing Credit Constrained - Regression Findings 
In table 4 three regressions are presented: the first considers only the covariates exoge-
nous to the firm and to the relationship. The second one, looks only at the firm and fi-
nance characteristics. The thirds one considers only the relationship between banks and 
firms. The number of observation considered is slightly different among the specifica-
tions but the t-tests on different datasets show no significant difference. Interestingly, 
the first specification is not significant at all stressing the fact that the exogenous vari-
ables do not affect the request of personal commitments. The second specification is 
significant at 99% and both INTOV and OVUSED are significant between 95% and 
99%. By examining the second regression, no support to Bester (1985) point about in-
terest – collateral pairs is found. In addition, finance characteristics of the firm impact 
on the request of personal commitments more than the exogenous general characteris-
tics of the area and of the economic context. In fact, the covariates that are not signifi-
cant are borderline. 
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Table 4 – Regression findings 
 
Exogenous Model Endogenous Model Relationship Model 
Number of obs 455 Number of obs 422 Number of obs 450
Replications 750 Replications 750 Replications 750
Wald chi2(4) 4.22 Wald chi2(4) 16.16 Wald chi2(6) 9.75
Prob > chi2 0.3461 Prob > chi2 0.0028 Prob > chi2 0.1357
Log likelihood -218.6694 Log likelihood -191.1557 Log likelihood -213.392
Pseudo R2 0.0087 Pseudo R2 0.0458 Pseudo R2 0.0215
 
  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  
 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
LOCNAT -.40311 .47705        
NBANKS .07242 .04549        
REGION -.17193 .60235        
E
x
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
 
ECON -.13357 4.4531        
INTOV    .35396 .10478 ***    
OVUSED    .00861 .00390 **    
LNTURNOVR    .17048 .11116     H a
r
d
 
LNSTD    .19491 .12079     
LNLENGTH       .19350 .15089 * 
FREQREV       .43533 .25412  
FREQMEET       -.01269 .11274  
BANKMAN       .08543 .15596  
MULTI       .14679 .26263  R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
TRUST       -.24476 .13011 * 
 
_CONS 1.0775 .42353 *** -5.4976 2.2058 ** .03980 .62358  
* Sig. at 90% 
** Sig. at 95% 
*** Sig. at 99%
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The specification that consider only the relationship variables is not significant and has 
an adjusted R² greater than 0.02. All the variables entered are not significant except 
TRUST and LNLENGTH that are significant at 90% level. Interestingly, what can be 
derived by looking at the three regressions is that only firm financial and operational 
characteristics affect the request of personal commitments. 
Moving on in the analysis, in table 5 four specification are presented. The first one con-
siders only hard covariates (that is the exogenous variables and firms’ specifics charac-
teristics); the second enter the relationship covariates except TRUST. This gives us the 
possibility to compare the specification results to the findings of previous research and 
test how relationship variables impact on the request of personal commitments. TRUST 
is entered in the third one. By entering it separately we can appreciate how it impacts on 
the model. The last regression is the parsimonious version of the third specification, 
where the covariates that are not significant are dropped. 
Regressions have adjusted R² between 0.058 and (first specification) and 0.087 (third 
regression). Only the last regression is significant at 99% according to Wald chi2 test: 
the first one is significant at 98%, the second one at 95% while the specification with all 
the covariates has a significant level slightly below 90%. Interestingly, the poor level of 
the specification emerges using the bootstrap technique for estimating the standard er-
rors. In fact, traditional estimation provide apparent stronger results with significance 
level of the specification always above 99.5%. 
Missing data affects slightly the number of observations in the regressions. T-tests on 
the dependent variable and firm dimension (LNTURNOVER) did not show any signifi-
cant difference at 99% level between datasets. The third (and fourth) specification pro-
vide a weak support to the hypothesis: TRUST has the expected sign (negative) con-
firming the role of trust in reducing the request of personal commitments and it also 
maintains negative sign (and is significant) in specifications not reported here. 
Turning attention to other covariates, only competition (NBANK) is significant among 
the exogenous variables (even if only at 90%); the area (REGION), the bank character-
istic (LOCNAT) as well as the economic context (ECON) does not affect personal 
commitments pledging. Interestingly, hard covariates are significant: INTOV is posi-
tively related to COLL and is significant. The relationship between personal commit-
ments and the amount of short term credit is as expected (even if very weak) as well as 
the relationship with the average use of the credit gained. Managers and shareholders of 
firm with greater turnover (that is bigger and more powerful ones) are not necessarily 
better off in avoiding to provide personal commitments to the bank. 
It is interesting that all the relational variables but LNLENGTH do not affect personal 
commitments pledging significantly. The LNLEGTH is positively and significantly 
linked to personal commitments pledging supporting the point that firms suffer bank 
capture effect. The frequency with which the bank check the line of credit is positively 
linked to commitments (it is not significant but border line). A possible explanation is 
that riskiest firms are those which are more monitored on one hand and are requested to 
provide more personal commitments on the other. 
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Table 5 – Regression findings 
 
Number of obs 422 Number of obs 417 Number of obs 417 Number of obs 422
Replications 750 Replications 750 Replications 750 Replications 750
Wald chi2(8) 19.60 Wald chi2(13) 22.16 Wald chi2(14) 20.73 Wald chi2(9) 23.93
Prob > chi2 0.0120 Prob > chi2 0.0530 Prob > chi2 0.1089 Prob > chi2 0.0044
Log likelihood -191.5524 Log likelihood -185.3007 Log likelihood -183.4161 Log likelihood -188.8478
Pseudo R2 0.0585 Pseudo R2 0.0779 Pseudo R2 0.0873 Pseudo R2 0.0718
 
  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  
 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
LOCNAT -.89812 .63994  -.79494 .81820  -.83830 .79037  `   
NBANKS .08549 .06040  .13129 .07772 * .14035 .07808 * .03475 .04051  
REGION -.87432 .82204  -1.0778 .97064  -1.2980 .96159  -.63628 .42204  
E
x
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
 
ECON 2.1907 6.2888  4.7864 7.9039  6.1056 7.4398     
INTOV .41743 .12053 *** .39893 .13359 *** .39739 .13992 *** .36469 .11873 *** 
OVUSE .00892 .00386 ** .00843 .00431 ** .00774 .00450 * .00805 .00393 ** 
LNSTD .22558 .13335 * .17133 .14326  .21319 .14661  .22558 .13335 * 
H
a
r
d
 
LNTURNOVR .15736 .13470  .20031 .14080  .20275 .15004  .15736 .13470  
LNLENGTH    .25146 .17894  .30393 .20073  .30348 .16797 * 
FREQREV    .42619 .36147  .45611 .39030  .41519 .28781  
FREQMEET    -.03729 .12994  -.02651 .12893     
BANKMAN    .23651 .23861  .26567 .22389     
MULTI    .17619 .29803  .16082 .29562     R e
l
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
TRUST       -.27634 .16117 * -.23656 .13947 * 
 
_CONS -6.4416 2.6354 *** -8.4339 2.9413 *** -9.2225 3.1758 *** -7.1806 2.4320 *** 
* Sig. at 90% 
** Sig. at 95% 
*** Sig. at 99%
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5.1 Comments on Findings 
The regression analysis shows that trust does have an impact on reducing the request of 
personal commitments even if the finding is not highly significant. Interestingly, all re-
lationship covariates entered in the regressions (even in those not reported here) are not 
significant (except for the length of the relationship); only the variables that measure the 
economic and financial characteristics of the firm are significant. Moreover, the signifi-
cance level of the specifications is quite poor stressing the fact that the suggested model 
does not capture the determinants of the request of personal guarantees. These findings 
are not only at least partially in contradiction with the hypothesis but also with previous 
literature.  
An explanation can be found by looking at Howorth and Moro (2006) research. They 
provide a quote of one of the bank managers they interviewed who stated that “Trust 
influences the credit conditions more at the beginning of the relationship: as the rela-
tionship evolves we tend to keep unchanged the previous conditions.” Our econometric 
findings support this statement. This means that, possibly, banks are over-hedged when 
they provide credit to successful firms since as the risk decreases they do not adapt the 
request of personal commitments accordingly. If this can be sensible from the bank 
point of view, it is not from the entrepreneurs’ one. Why entrepreneurs do not react? 
Two different explanation can be provided: either the bank exploit hold up situation 
linked to the small dimension of the SMEs and their incapability to swift to another 
bank; or firms’ owners as well as firms’ managers are not very concerned about the per-
sonal commitments they provide to the bank. In order to investigate which is the reason, 
we ran some interviews with entrepreneurs and bank managers who were asked to com-
ments on our findings. 
Some entrepreneurs clearly stated that they are not concerned to provide personal com-
mitments to the bank since this is the standard way to run the business and to collect 
finance. One of them clearly told us “this is my own business: is there something wrong 
in investing in it all my personal wealth?”. Even bank managers support this point. One 
of them told us “I clearly state to the entrepreneurs: if you do not invest in the venture 
all your personal wealth, you’ll tell us you are not committed to your venture. So, why 
do I have to trust your venture?” An additional support was given by some entrepre-
neurs who clearly stated that they did not remember whether they had provided the bank 
with personal guarantees: one of them questioned us “does it matter?” Others wrongly 
thought that the bank was not provided with personal commitments. This emerged by 
crosschecking what the entrepreneurs told us and evidences in the bank files. Finally, 
according to bank managers interviews, entrepreneurs very infrequently ask to be un-
pledged. Indeed, bank managers stressed this is the least common request and usually it 
is interpreted negatively by the bank. Bank managers’ tend to stress that often, soon af-
ter the request of being unpledged, the performance of the firm deteriorates. Thus, bank 
managers are used to interpret the request of unpledging personal commitments as 
“warning light” that is an attempt by the entrepreneurs to save their personal assets 
when they know personal assets are at real risk. Thus, paradoxically, when the entrepre-
neurs ask for being unpledged, they hardly are satisfied in their request.  
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Overall, interviews support the argument that entrepreneurs do not seem bother whether 
they are requested to provide personal collateral. They do not pay too much attention to 
the terms of credit and their financial implications of their venture since they are mainly 
focused on the operations, the relationships with customer and suppliers, the manage-
ment of the human resources, etc. Possibly, our econometric finding (a negative rela-
tionship between trust and personal commitments) is mainly linked to trust between 
bank managers and customers that pre-exists in the lending relationship. This can hap-
pen because of bank managers’ knowledge of the entrepreneur is based on gossip and 
information the bank manager was able to access before starting the lending relation-
ship. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Present study is an additional step in the research about the role trust plays in the busi-
ness relationship. There is some research that looks at the role of trust in accessing ven-
ture capital, in developing relationships with business angels, in accessing trade credit, 
in getting support from customers and suppliers when starting up or a spinning off a 
firm. At the same time, there is lack of empirical research about the role of trust in 
banking relationships. Even though it is a contractual relationship, underpinning the po-
tential creditor’s analysis of the risk return trade-off is an assessment of the trustworthi-
ness of the borrower. 
By approaching lending relationship from a different perspective, present research 
opens a new, interesting perspective on pledging personal commitments. We find partial 
support to our argument that decision to require personal commitments cannot be re-
duced to facts and figures because trust (and soft information in general) plays an im-
portant role in accessing credit. We argue that the weak role of trust is due to the fact 
that personal commitments are requested at the beginning of the relationship (when trust 
is implicitly very low) and that there is some inertia in both the bank system (which ex-
ploit hold up situations) and in entrepreneurs in reducing private collateral. Indeed, the 
entrepreneurs are not concerned about the additional personal wealth they implicitly in-
vest in the venture as personal commitments. 
Present research opens up scope for future research. The first area for further investiga-
tion might be to test the hypotheses in regions with a different cultural background 
mainly to investigate if such a state of mind about personal commitments is general or 
country/region specific. Secondly, it could be interesting to investigate why entrepre-
neurs, owners and managers of SMEs are not concerned about the guarantees provided. 
Finally, it could be interesting to investigate whether the changes in the value of per-
sonal commitments provided affect the lending decisions of the banks either asking for 
more personal commitments or reducing the line of credit provided. In fact, if changes 
in personal wealth do not affect lending decisions, it could mean that trust may play 
some real role on the request of personal commitments. 
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